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Abstract
Given the methodological sophistication of the debate over the “political resource
curse” — the purported negative relationship between natural resource wealth (in
particular oil wealth) and democracy — it is surprising that scholars have not paid
more attention to the basic statistical issue of how to deal with missing data. This
article highlights the problems caused by the most common strategy for analyzing
missing data in the political resource curse literature — listwise deletion — and
investigates how addressing such problems through the best-practice technique of
multiple imputation affects empirical results. I find that multiple imputation causes
the results of a number of influential recent studies to converge on a key common
finding: a political resource curse does exist, but only since the widespread national-
ization of petroleum industries in the 1970s. This striking finding suggests that much
of the controversy over the political resource curse has been caused by a neglect of
missing-data issues.
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Introduction
The debate over the existence of a so-called “political resource curse” — a negative
relationship between natural resource wealth (in particular oil wealth) and democracy
— has attained a high degree of methodological sophistication in recent years. It is thus
surprising that contributors to this debate have not paid more attention to one of the
most basic issues in the statistical analysis of cross-national political and economic data,
namely, how to handle missing values. Datasets used to examine the political resource
curse are often highly incomplete; indeed, I later show that levels of missingness in such
datasets tend to be markedly higher than in other areas of quantitative comparative
politics research. Nevertheless, analysts continue to deal with such values using the ad-
hoc technique of listwise deletion — that is, to omit observations with missing values
on any variable — which is known to produce inefficient and often biased statistical
inferences in the typical conditions of applied empirical research.1
This article draws attention to the methodological problems caused by the use of
listwise deletion in statistical analyses of the political resource curse and examines how
addressing such problems through the best-practice technique of multiple imputation
affects empirical results. I argue that, in addition to being inefficient, listwise deletion
tends to produce biased inferences in such analyses because the distribution of missing
values is not completely random. Most notably, authoritarian states are more likely to
have incomplete data, causing listwise deletion to yield samples that are skewed toward
the most democratic nations in the dataset — a selection problem that I call pro-democracy
bias. Multiple imputation, which has long been recommended by statisticians and is now
1For instance, 27 of the 29 empirical studies included in Ahmadov’s (2013) recent meta-analysis of the
political resource curse employ listwise deletion as their primary missing-data method. The remaining
two studies employ another ad-hoc and typically biased technique (linear interpolation in one case and
a combination of linear interpolation, mean substitution, and zero imputation in the other). Worryingly,
more than half of the studies — all of which employ listwise deletion — are not explicit about how they
deal with missing data.
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emerging as the principal alternative to listwise deletion in many areas of the social and
natural sciences, involves replacing each missing cell with multiple values based on
information contained in the observed portion of the dataset.2 By utilizing all observed
values, keeping incomplete observations in the sample, and preserving key relationships
in the data, it both produces considerably more efficient inferences than listwise deletion
and — crucially — avoids selection problems such as pro-democracy bias.
The reexamination reveals that multiple imputation alters the results of a number of
prominent recent studies in ways that present a strikingly coherent, unified picture of
the political resource curse. I focus on two important ongoing debates in the literature.3
The first concerns the extent to which existing statistical evidence for a political resource
curse is plagued by omitted variable bias and other sources of endogeneity.4 I find that
multiple imputation challenges Haber and Menaldo’s (2011) influential conclusion that
oil wealth is not negatively related to changes in democracy once we control for country
fixed effects (and other sources of unobserved heterogeneity). Rather, it supports An-
dersen and Ross’s (2014) claim that Haber and Menaldo’s analysis does provide evidence
of a negative relationship, but only after the widespread nationalization of petroleum
industries in the 1970s, which enabled governments to seize control of oil rents. In addi-
tion, it corroborates the results of Ramsay’s (2011) instrumental variables analysis of the
political resource curse — an alternative strategy for addressing endogeneity — which,
2According to van Buuren (2012), multiple imputation is “now accepted as the best general method
to deal with incomplete data in many fields” (p. 25). For statistics on the rapid growth of the applied
literature on multiple imputation in recent decades, see pp. 27-28.
3As discussed in the third section, these debates emerged in response to Ross’s (2001) classic study
“Does Oil Hinder Democracy?,” which presented the first cross-national statistical analysis of the political
resource curse. I begin the reexamination with this study, finding that multiple imputation undermines
its central finding that oil wealth (measured as fuel exports as a fraction of GDP) is negatively associated
with levels of democracy.
4In the political science literature, the term “endogeneity” is sometimes used to refer more narrowly
to reverse causation between the dependent and explanatory variables. I use the term in the traditional
econometric sense, that is, to refer to situations in which the explanatory variable is correlated with the
error term (of which reverse causation is merely one instance).
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consistent with Andersen and Ross’s findings, indicates the existence of such a curse
during a period that mostly coincides with or follows the wave of nationalizations.
The second debate concerns the effects of oil wealth on the stability of different types
of political regimes. I find that multiple imputation casts doubt on evidence for Morri-
son’s (2009) notable argument that oil and other nontax revenues reduce the probability
of regime change in both dictatorships and democracies by enabling them to appease
social groups that pose a threat to regime survival. Instead, it indicates that such rev-
enues have “antidemocratic” effects, prolonging dictatorships but destabilizing democra-
cies. Critically, however, such effects are once again restricted to the post-1980 period.
These findings are substantiated by reanalyses of two important additional studies of
the impact of oil wealth on regime stability: Ross’s (2012) book “The Oil Curse,” whose
results were already in line with the findings; and Wright, Frantz, and Geddes’s (2015)
study of the mechanisms of autocratic regime survival, whose results were only partially
consistent with the findings but become fully consistent when re-estimated.
The reexamination thus provides remarkably congruent evidence that there is a polit-
ical resource curse, albeit only during the relatively recent period in which governments
have controlled most of the rents generated by petroleum production. These findings
both shed new empirical light on the existence and scope conditions of the political re-
source curse and suggest that a major reason different studies of this issue have produced
conflicting results is that they have overlooked the problem of missing data.
The Neglected Missing-Data Problem
In this section, I provide a brief overview of the missing-data problem in statistical
analyses of the political resource curse. The first part of the section discusses the specific
methodological issues that arise when listwise deletion is used to deal with missing data
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in such analyses. The second part explains how multiple imputation can help to address
these issues and hence improve the quality of statistical inferences.
Listwise Deletion and Pro-Democracy Bias
While scholars of the political resource curse are generally aware of the relatively high
proportion of missing values in their datasets — a trend that I systematically document
in the following section — they have paid surprisingly little attention to the potential
methodological pitfalls of using listwise deletion to handle such values.5 The perfor-
mance of listwise deletion in analyses of the political resource curse can be evaluated in
terms of three basic statistical criteria: bias, efficiency, and the ability to yield reasonable
estimates of uncertainty (Graham, 2009). With respect to efficiency, listwise deletion is
always wanting: by discarding information contained in incomplete observations, it re-
sults in higher standard errors, wider confidence intervals, and reduced statistical power.
Although it fares better on the third criterion — estimated standard errors are generally
valid — this advantage is offset by losses in efficiency (Allison, 2002).
The bias caused by listwise deletion is a more complex issue that rests on the mech-
anism by which data become missing. Scholars usually distinguish between three such
mechanisms (Little & Rubin, 1987, 2002). Data are (1) missing completely at random
(MCAR) if the probability that a given value is missing does not depend on any in-
formation in the dataset; (2) missing at random (MAR) if it depends on observed data
only; and (3) missing not at random (MNAR) if it depends (at least in part) on missing
data.6 Listwise deletion produces unbiased inferences only when the MCAR assump-
5Efforts to address the problem of missing data have mostly focused on compiling new data sources,
triangulating between existing ones, and identifying alternative treatments. While such efforts are highly
valuable, they must be accompanied by the adoption of modern missing-data methods (such as multiple
imputation) in order to avoid the statistical problems described in this section.
6More formally, if Z denotes a dataset with an observed portion Zobs and a missing portion Zmis,
M denotes a matrix of the same dimensions as Z in which cells have a value of 1 if missing and 0
otherwise, and φ denotes parameters from the joint distribution function of Z, MCAR can be expressed
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tion holds — that is, when omitting incomplete observations leaves a random sample
of the data. Under MAR or MNAR, deleting such observations produces samples that
are skewed away from units with characteristics that render them more likely to have
missing data.
How do data on the political resource curse become missing? A first, crucial point
is that the MCAR assumption is unlikely to be satisfied in any area of comparative
politics or political science more generally. As Cranmer and Gill (2013) note, “It is
difficult to think of a situation in political science, other than a computer malfunction,
that would result in missing values being entirely unrelated to any attribute or political
phenomena, observed or unobserved” (429). Indeed, in the next section I show that the
MCAR assumption — which, unlike the MAR and MNAR assumptions, can be tested in
practice — is violated in every study I reanalyze. In general, therefore, listwise deletion
will tend to produce biased inferences in analyses of the political resource curse.
If missingness in datasets on the political resource curse is not completely random,
what is it caused by? While the answer will vary from one dataset to another depending
on its specific range of countries, years, and variables, one factor that tends to be impor-
tant in almost all cases is a state’s political institutions.7 Empirical studies have found that
democracies are more likely to release policy-relevant socioeconomic data to the public
and to international organizations than dictatorships (controlling for income and other
variables) (Edwards, Coolidge, & Preston, 2011; Hollyer, Rosendorff, & Vreeland, 2011;
Ross, 2006).8 One potential explanation for this difference is that democratic leaders
as: p(M|Zobs, Zmis) = p(M|φ); MAR as p(M|Zobs, Zmis) = p(M|Zobs, φ); and MNAR as p(M|Zobs, Zmis) =
p(M|Zobs, Zmis, φ).
7Other possible determinants of missingness include a state’s size, economic system, bureaucratic ca-
pacity, investment inflows from foreign oil companies, and integration into global energy markets. The
importance of these factors may vary by time period, making the latter another potential determinant.
For instance, levels of missing data are likely to be higher for communist states during the Cold War,
newly independent states in the 1960s, and almost all oil producers before the emergence of global energy
markets in the 1990s.
8Interestingly, Ross (2006) argues that high-income autocracies are less likely to release such informa-
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have stronger incentives to adhere to popular demands for transparency because they
can be removed from power (Hollyer, Rosendorff, & Vreeland, 2011). Another is that
democracies depend less on strong economic performance for their legitimacy and are
thus less concerned about revealing the true state of the economy. It is also conceiv-
able that democratic institutions embody norms of transparency and accountability that
politicians externalize in their interactions with the international community.9 Regard-
less of the precise causal mechanism, measures of democracy are likely to be strongly
related to the pattern of missing data.
The upshot is that applying listwise deletion to datasets on the political resource
curse will often give rise to a selection problem that might be called pro-democracy bias.
Since authoritarian states typically report fewer data, listwise deletion will tend to pro-
duce samples in which the most democratic nations in the dataset are overrepresented.
The effect of this bias on estimates of the strength of the negative relationship between
democracy and natural resource wealth will depend on the particular range of coun-
tries and years covered by the dataset. In some datasets, observations with lower levels
of democracy will have higher levels of resource wealth, causing inferences based on
listwise deletion to understate the strength of this relationship. In other datasets, less
democratic observations will have lower levels of resource wealth, producing the oppo-
site effect. In either case, as shown in the next section, pro-democracy bias has significant
implications for our empirical understanding of the political resource curse.
tion than low-income ones because they rely less on the financial support of international organizations
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which demand data in return for assistance.
In line with this argument, neither Edwards, Coolidge, and Preston (2011) nor Hollyer, Rosendorff, and
Vreeland (2011) find a consistent relationship between per capita income and transparency.
9Similar claims have been made about democratic norms of peaceful conflict resolution and compro-
mise in the international relations literature on the democratic peace.
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Addressing the Problem with Multiple Imputation
How can multiple imputation address the shortcomings of listwise deletion in analyses
of the political resource curse? Multiple imputation involves three key stages.10 First,
m values are imputed for each missing cell, with variation across values reflecting un-
certainty about the correct imputation model. Imputed values are independent draws
from a posterior distribution of the missing data conditional on the observed data, typi-
cally derived from a parametric model that assumes the complete data are multivariate
normal.11 Second, each of the m complete datasets are analyzed. Due to the separation
between the imputation and analysis stages, complete-data methods can be applied to
each dataset, making this a straightforward task. Finally, the m separate point estimates
are combined into one using the “Rubin rules” (Rubin, 1987). These rules state that
the pooled point estimate is equal to the average of the m estimates, while its variance is
equal to a weighted sum of the estimated variances within and between the m datasets.12
Multiple imputation is substantially more efficient than listwise deletion because it
(1) utilizes rather than discards data in incomplete observations and (2) allows analysts
to incorporate extra information into the imputation model by including variables that
are not in the analysis (“auxiliary variables”). Multiple imputation also performs at least
as well as listwise deletion on the third criterion mentioned earlier as it reflects uncer-
tainty about imputed values and thus yields valid estimates of standard errors. This is
a major advantage over ad-hoc “single” imputation methods such as mean substitution,
zero imputation, and linear interpolation. These methods produce downward-biased
standard errors because they treat imputed values as “knowns” rather than probabilistic
10Multiple imputation was first proposed by the statistician Donald Rubin in the late 1970s and further
developed with collaborators over the next decade (Little & Rubin, 1987; Rubin, 1976, 1977, 1987; Rubin &
Schenker, 1986).
11While real data obviously do not always conform to multivariate normality, this model has been found
to perform well even in the presence of violations (Rubin & Schenker, 1986; Schafer, 1997).
12That is, for a given quantity of interest β (say, a regression coefficient), βˆ = 1m ∑
m
i=1 βˆi and var(βˆ) =
W + (1 + 1m )B, where W =
1
m ∑
m
i=1 var(βˆi) and B =
1
m−1 ∑
m
i=1(βˆi − βˆ)2.
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estimates.13 They can thus be legitimately accused of “making up data” — a common
misconception about multiple imputation. The goal of multiple imputation is in fact to
preserve important features of the existing data (such as means, variances, and covari-
ances) while capturing the uncertainty inherent in missing-data prediction.
Can multiple imputation address selection problems such as pro-democracy bias?
Unlike listwise deletion, multiple imputation is unbiased when data are MAR as well as
MCAR. Under MNAR, however, multiple imputation cannot avoid bias: since missing-
ness depends (to some extent) on missing values, observed data alone do not provide
the basis for a valid imputation process. Strictly speaking, real data are almost always
MNAR, with missingness depending in part on observed data and in part on missing
data (Graham, 2009). Critically, however, multiple imputation is not seriously biased
under MNAR if missingness is strongly related to observed data and thus approximates
MAR (Collins, Schafer, & Kam, 2001; Graham, Hofer, & MacKinnon, 1996; Schafer, 1997).
The key question is thus: How much does missingness depend on observed data?14 Ob-
viously, this is not possible to directly measure because we do not actually have access
to missing data. Nevertheless, if the dataset contains one or more variables that are
highly correlated with missingness, it is reasonable to assume that multiple imputation
will perform almost as well as under (pure) MAR. If there are no such variables, how-
ever, the technique may result in major bias — though, importantly, still no more than
listwise deletion in almost all cases.15 Indeed, even in this worst-case scenario multiple
13They also frequently produce biased point estimates (for different reasons in each case) (Little & Rubin,
2002).
14As Graham (2009) argues, “Because all missingness is MNAR (i.e., not purely MAR), then whether
it is MNAR or not should never be the issue. Rather than focusing on whether [multiple imputation’s]
assumptions are violated, we should answer the question of whether the violation is big enough to matter
to any practical extent” (567).
15If the analysis model is a (correctly specified) regression of Y on X, data for X are MNAR, and
missingness does not depend on Y, it is possible for listwise deletion to be less biased than multiple
imputation. These conditions, however, are rarely satisfied in the real world (King et al., 2001; van Buuren,
2012).
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imputation is still the preferable of the two strategies due to its superior efficiency.
The implication is that multiple imputation can help to mitigate pro-democracy bias
so long as variables that measure or are correlated with democracy are included in
the dataset — which, of course, is always the case in analyses of the political resource
curse.16 The precise extent of these gains in bias reduction will vary as a function of
two factors. The first is the proportion of incomplete observations in the dataset. The
higher this fraction, the greater the extent to which more democratic observations will
be overrepresented in samples produced by listwise deletion and thus the greater the
gains from keeping all observations in the sample through multiple imputation. The
second is the number of variables in the dataset that are related to missingness. While
all datasets on the political resource curse contain at least one such variable — i.e., a
measure of democracy — higher numbers increase the degree to which missingness is
related to observed data and thus lower the bias resulting from multiple imputation.
Reexamining Previous Findings
The preceding discussion suggests that in analyses of the political resource curse multi-
ple imputation typically offers major gains in efficiency and bias reduction over listwise
deletion (and almost never performs worse than it). This section investigates how substi-
tuting multiple imputation for listwise deletion affects the results of a number of influ-
ential empirical studies on the topic. I begin by providing an overview of missing-data
patterns in these studies and describing the specific steps by which I implement multiple
imputation. The rest of the section presents the results of the reanalysis in detail.
16Note that such variables are also correlated with the other potential determinants of missingness
mentioned in fn. 7. (The time-series index in the dataset — normally Year — will capture temporal
variation in the importance of these determinants and in missingness more generally.) Hence, multiple
imputation will typically be capable of addressing a diverse range of selection problems.
10
Scope and Implementation
I re-estimate the results of seven empirical studies on the political resource curse (see Ta-
ble 1). These studies were selected for four reasons. First, most of them were conducted
recently — all but one were published after 2008 — and can thus be said to represent
“state-of-the-art” knowledge on the topic. Second, despite their novelty, they are widely
cited in the academic literature and in many cases have also received considerable atten-
tion in policymaking circles.17 Third, and closely related, they have each introduced sig-
nificant theoretical and/or empirical innovations that have influenced subsequent stud-
ies and advanced our understanding of the political resource curse, as discussed in more
detail later.18 Finally, they contribute to arguably the two most prominent ongoing de-
bates in the literature, namely, those concerning (1) whether there is statistical evidence
for a political resource curse once we properly control for sources of endogeneity; and
(2) how oil wealth affects the stability of different types of political regimes.
An examination of the studies’ datasets and main empirical analyses reveals two
important trends.19 First, as shown in Table 1, they suffer from a severe missing-data
problem. On average, almost one-quarter of the cells in the datasets are missing, with
the figure exceeding 30 percent in three studies. The use of listwise deletion excludes
more than 40 percent of eligible observations from the studies’ analyses, causing the loss
of 37 percent of available observed values.20 As a result, a relatively large proportion of
17The studies have a combined citation count of more than 4,000 on Google Scholar (search performed
27 May 2016). Three of the studies published after 2008 — Haber and Menaldo (2011), Morrison (2009),
and Ross (2012) – already have more than 300 citations each.
18One obvious candidate for inclusion is Tsui’s (2011) study of the impact of oil discoveries on long-
term democratic development, which, together with Ramsay (2011), pioneered the use of instrumental
variables analysis in the literature. This study is excluded because it employs multiyear averages of time-
series variables — an ad-hoc and typically biased missing-data strategy (see previous section) — and thus
contains a purely cross-sectional sample of 158 observations with almost no missing values.
19Three of the datasets were obtained from online data repositories (Morrison, 2009; Ross, 2001, 2012),
one from an author’s personal website (Haber & Menaldo, 2011), and two through personal communica-
tions with authors (Ramsay, 2011; Wright, Frantz, & Geddes, 2015).
20This is stark evidence of the inefficiency caused by listwise deletion. By preserving information in
incomplete observations, multiple imputation utilizes an average of 93 percent more observed values in
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Table 1. Overview of Datasets in Reanalyzed Studies
Main Empirical Analysis (%) Polity Effect
on Inclusion
Study
Missing
Cells (%)
Cases
Omitted
Existing
Data Lost
Countries
Missing
Years
Missing
MCAR Sign p < 0.01
Ross 2001 33.37 41.84 37.21 26.75 15.63 8 + ***
Morrison 2009 32.65 78.52 69.84 44.57 32.56 8 + ***
Haber & Menaldo 2011/
Anderson & Ross 2014
30.83 67.08 67.08 44.64 0.48 8 + ***
Ramsay 2011 2.97 22.77 21.79 5.73 0.00 8 + ***
Ross 2012 27.12 12.58 5.05 5.06 3.75 8 N.A.
Wright, Frank, & Geddes
2015
13.89 27.08 18.51 18.57 7.58 8 N.A.
Average 23.47 41.65 36.58 24.22 10.00
“MCAR” = missing completely at random. “Polity Effect on Inclusion” refers to the results of a logistic
regression in which the dependent variable is dummy for whether a given observation is included in a
study’s main analysis and the regressor is a measure of Polity scores (Ross 2012 and Wright, Frantz, and
Geddes 2015 are excluded because their analyses are restricted to either democracies or dictatorships).
eligible countries in the datasets — almost one-quarter on average — are not just under-
represented but entirely omitted from the analyses.21 Naturally, levels of missingness
and data loss vary across the studies, and are relatively modest in the case of Ramsay
(2011) and Ross (2012). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in the majority of studies at
least 27 percent of cells in the dataset is missing, 27 percent of eligible observations are
excluded from the analysis, 22 percent of available observed data are lost, and 19 percent
of eligible countries are completely discarded.
Is the missing-data problem in these studies unusually severe? To answer this ques-
tion, I conducted a systematic review of missingness in a large sample of recently pub-
lished comparative politics studies. Specifically, I sought to obtain the dataset of every
cross-national quantitative study published during the three-year period 2013-15 inclu-
the datasets.
21As shown in the sixth column, the proportion of eligible years excluded is fairly low, but still exceeds
15 percent in two cases.
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sive in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, Com-
parative Political Studies, the Journal of Politics, and World Politics.22 Through searches of
online data repositories and authors’ personal websites, I was able to acquire 114 of the
231 datasets, a full list of which is provided in Table A1 of the online appendix (along
with individual values of the statistics described below).23 On average, 14 percent of
cells in the datasets were missing, more than 40 percent lower than the equivalent figure
for the six political resource curse datasets (23 percent). Moreover, 61 percent of obser-
vations in the former datasets had at least one missing value (a rough proxy for how
much information will be lost due to listwise deletion), compared with 90 percent in the
latter.24 This evidence strongly suggests that the missing-data problem in studies of the
political resource curse is indeed more severe than in other areas of comparative politics
(while indicating that such areas would also benefit from adopting more sophisticated
missing-data methods).
The second trend is that the datasets are considerably better suited to multiple impu-
tation than listwise deletion. The standard “Little’s MCAR test,” which evaluates a null
MCAR hypothesis that observed variable means for subgroups of observations sharing
the same missing-data pattern do not differ from expected population means based on
maximum likelihood estimates, indicates that the the MCAR assumption is not satisfied
in a single case (full test results are reported in Table A2 of the online appendix).25 Fur-
thermore, missingness is strongly related to observed data. All the datasets contain a
variable recording Polity scores, the standard measure of democracy in the literature.
Moreover, the sample included in each study’s main analysis has a substantially higher
22I excluded studies on the political resource curse (of which there were two).
2356 of the datasets were obtained from online repositories (in most cases the Harvard Dataverse Net-
work) and 54 from personal websites.
24A small number of studies employ multiple datasets. In such cases, I averaged these statistics across
all datasets.
25See Little (1988) for further details. The test was implemented using the mcartest command in Stata
(version 13.1), which in some instances required removing highly collinear variables from the dataset.
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mean Polity score than the sample excluded from it (see Table A3).26 While we cannot
compare absolute means across studies because they are based on alternative versions of
the Polity dataset and are scaled in different ways (as discussed in more detail below),
the included sample means are on average 97 percent higher than the excluded ones. A
Student’s t-test shows that in each case these differences are statistically significant at
the one percent level.27
To more rigorously assess the extent to which missingness is related to democracy,
for each study I estimated a logistic regression model in which the dependent variable is
a dummy variable indicating whether or not a given observation is included in the main
analysis and the regressor is a variable recording Polity scores. As indicated in Table 1,
the coefficients on the latter variable are positive and significant at the one percent level
in all studies.28 It is also important to note that in each dataset there were several other
variables that had positive and significant coefficients when added to the regression
model (including income, economic growth, public spending, and trade). In sum, any
bias resulting from multiple imputation is likely to be small.
To implement multiple imputation, I use Honaker, King, and Blackwell’s Amelia II
program in R, the most widely used multiple imputation software in political science.29
My implementation strategy follows the recommendations of the Amelia II’s software
manual, with a few small exceptions (Honaker, King, & Blackwell, 2011). First, since
Amelia II’s expectation-maximization algorithm sometimes fails to converge when ap-
plied to large datasets, if the total number of variables exceeds 100 I exclude from the
26If the samples vary across estimations models in the main analysis, I take an average of the different
sample means. Ross (2012) and Wright, Frantz, and Geddes (2015) are omitted from Table A2 because
their analyses are restricted to either democracies or dictatorships.
27I separately calculate the gaps for each estimation model in the main analysis and combine the p-
values using Fisher’s method.
28 Ross (2012) and Wright, Frantz, and Geddes (2015) are again excluded for the reason mentioned in
fn. 26.
29The m complete datasets generated by Amelia II are imported into Stata (version 13.1), where analysis
results are aggregated using the built-in mi command.
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imputation model all auxiliary variables that fail to meet the following two require-
ments: (1) they have a correlation of r ≥ 0.5 with at least one analysis variable or at
least one specially created dummy indicating whether observations for a given analysis
variable are missing; and (2) less than 25 percent of their values are missing (since highly
incomplete variables provide information at greater cost in terms of model size).30
Second, I do not round off imputed values for categorical variables to the nearest dis-
crete number, as this practice has been shown to produce biased parameter estimates.31
For the same reason, I also avoid applying logarithmic, square root, and logistic transfor-
mations to heavily skewed variables to normalize their distributions.32 I add only three
features to the imputation model: (1) a sequence of third-order time polynomials to bet-
ter model smooth temporal variation within cross-section units; (2) lags of the dependent
and key explanatory variables (or leads if they are already lagged) since data for one pe-
riod tend to be highly correlated with data for the previous (and subsequent) period;
and (3) a ridge prior of one percent of the total number of observations, which addresses
computational problems caused by high levels of missing data and multicollinearity.
Finally, I conduct more than the five imputations generally recommended by Amelia
II’s software manual (Honaker, King, & Blackwell, 2011, 2). Recent statistical research has
shown that conducting only five imputations frequently results in unacceptably weak
statistical power, wide confidence intervals, and large Monte Carlo standard errors (i.e.,
errors across repeated runs of the same imputation process) (Bodner, 2008; Graham,
30Similar rules have been proposed by Schafer (1997); White, Royston, and Wood 2011. The 100-variable
threshold excludes the following four types of auxiliary variables, which are automatically omitted be-
cause they provide no extra information: (1) nonessential index variables; (2) items of composite variables;
(3) dummies based on other variables; and (4) variables measuring data parameters such as means and
variances.
31This is because such values are typically not normally distributed around the cutoff point (for instance,
0.5 in the case of binary variables) (Allison, 2005; Cranmer & Gill, 2013; Horton, Lipsitz, & Parzen, 2003).
32Transforming skewed variables alters their relationship with other variables in the imputation model;
in effect, it is equivalent to assuming that they have zero correlation with such variables (von Hippel,
2013).
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Olchowski, & Gilreath, 2007; White, Royston, & Wood, 2011). To avoid these problems, I
set m equal to the average missing-data rate of all variables in the imputation model.33
Does Oil Really Hinder Democracy?
I begin the reexamination by revisiting the findings of Ross’s (2001) seminal article “Does
Oil Hinder Democracy?” — one of the most influential studies in all of comparative
political economy — which launched the debate over the political resource curse.34 To
test the hypothesis that oil hinders democracy, which was first proposed by Middle East
specialists in the 1970s but previously examined only in a handful of case studies, Ross
analyzed pooled data on 157 countries in the period 1966-97 using a feasible generalized
least squares model. The dependent variable Regime is measured using Polity98 scores
(rescaled to run from 0 to 10), while the key explanatory variable Oil is measured as
mineral-based fuel exports as a fraction of GDP. In addition, the model contains a lagged
dependent variable, year dummies, and a host of control variables. The main results,
reproduced in Table 2, are consistent with the political resource curse hypothesis: the
coefficient on Oil is negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level in all three
specifications.35
While most variables in the analysis have relatively complete data, 40 percent of
values for Oil are missing. Consequently, listwise deletion restricts us to using just 58
percent of eligible observations and discards 37 percent of observed data. This results
in the complete exclusion of 42 of the 157 countries in the dataset. Importantly, obser-
vations included in the analysis differ systematically from those excluded, possessing
higher levels of both Regime and Oil. These differences are illustrated graphically in the
33A similar rule is suggested by van Buuren (2012).
34The study has more than 2,500 Google Scholar citations and is listed as the most cited research article
ever published in World Politics on the journal’s official website (both searches performed 27 May 2016).
35The replicated results differ marginally from the published results because the author made correc-
tions to the dataset before archiving it on the Harvard Dataverse Network.
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Table 2. Ross 2001: Resource Wealth and Democracy (Table 4)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Replicated Imputed Replicated Imputed Replicated Imputed
Regime (lagged) 0.267*** 0.261*** 0.239*** 0.263*** 0.242*** 0.264***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016)
Oil -0.030*** -0.007** -0.016*** -0.003 -0.011** -0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Minerals -0.043*** -0.012* -0.028*** -0.007 -0.028*** -0.007
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Income (log) 0.920*** -0.000 0.712*** -0.000 0.684*** -0.000
(0.100) (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.126) (0.000)
Islam -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
OECD 1.395*** 3.892*** 1.469*** 3.458*** 1.517*** 3.483***
(0.302) (0.269) (0.310) (0.262) (0.312) (0.262)
Large 0.429 -0.556***
(0.297) (0.161)
Mideast -2.792*** -1.272***
(0.427) (0.271)
SSAfrica -1.524*** -0.938*** -1.446*** -0.873***
(0.174) (0.150) (0.174) (0.148)
Arabian Peninsula -3.439*** -1.223***
(0.525) (0.291)
Constant -3.313*** 2.980*** -1.081 2.841*** -0.934 2.802***
(0.736) (0.233) (0.780) (0.196) (0.796) (0.196)
(0.736) (0.439) (0.780) (0.469) (0.796) (0.469)
N 2181 3750 2181 3750 2181 3750
Dependent variable is democracy (measured by Polity98 scores rescaled from 0 to 10). All right-
hand-side variables are lagged five years. Year dummies are estimated but not reported. Feasible
generalized least squares regressions corrected for first-order autocorrelation with standard errors
in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
upper-left panels of Figures 1 and 2, which plot the distribution of Regime and Oil, re-
spectively, for included (black line) and excluded (gray line) observations. In each case,
the distribution of excluded observations is concentrated at lower levels of the variable
than the distribution of included observations. The implication is that autocracies that
produce little or no oil — cases that do not provide evidence for the political resource
curse hypothesis — are underrepresented in the analysis. This may cause it to overesti-
mate the strength of the negative relationship between Oil and Regime.
Indeed, when the excluded observations are incorporated into the analysis through
multiple imputation — which enables us to use 59 percent more observed values and
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Figure 1. Polity Scores of Observations Included in and Excluded from Main Empirical Analysis
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almost twice as many observations — support for the political resource curse hypothesis
all but disappears. In Model 1, the coefficient on Oil shrinks to just one-fifth of its
original size, though remains significant at the five percent level. In Models 2 and 3,
which include region dummies, the coefficient halves again and loses significance. In
other words, once we control for the unobservable, time-invariant characteristics of an
oil producer’s region — or what Ross concisely calls “the region’s history” (2001, 345)
— we can no longer be confident that Oil has a strong negative relationship with Regime.
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Figure 2. Oil Wealth of Observations Included in and Excluded from Main Empirical Analysis
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Table 3, Model 4: Log Oil Income per Capita
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Since the article’s publication, there have been a large number of follow-up studies
that seek to address potential problems with its empirical analysis, generating a lively
debate over the validity of the original finding. Do the conclusions of these more recent
studies hold up when their results are re-estimated using multiple imputation? The rest
of the section examines attempts to deal with two important issues: (1) endogeneity,
which occurs when the explanatory variable is correlated with the error term; and (2)
failure to distinguish between the effects of oil wealth on dictatorships and democracies.
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The Conditional Effects of Oil on Democracy
There are three potential sources of endogeneity in Ross’s analysis: (1) measurement
error with respect to Oil; (2) reverse causation between Regime and Oil, for instance, if
oil prices respond to political changes or oil exports depend on income (because poorer
countries consume less oil domestically), which is in turn influenced by regime type
(Ross, 2008, 2012); and (3) perhaps most importantly, omitted variable bias resulting
from a failure to properly control for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity.
In an innovative recent study, Ramsay (2011) attempts to address all three possibili-
ties by employing an instrumental variables approach, which involves replacing the en-
dogenous variable with an “instrument” that is correlated with it but uncorrelated with
the error term (and thus does not directly affect the dependent variable).36 Specifically,
Ramsay uses out-of-region natural disasters as an instrument for the total value of oil
production per capita (rather than oil exports as a fraction of GDP), on the grounds that
such events cannot influence regime type other than through their effect on the price of
oil.37 Analyzing panel data on 48 oil producers in the period 1968-2002 using two-stage
least squares regression, Ramsay finds evidence of a political resource curse. As shown
in Table 3, the predicted values of Log Oil Income per Capita have a negative and signifi-
cant relationship with (normalized) Polity IV scores. Unlike before, however, the results
are robust to multiple imputation: while marginally declining in size, the coefficient on
Log Oil Income per Capita remains negative and significant in all four replicated models.
What explains this difference? Ramsay’s dataset, in contrast to Ross’s, has a low
36Other innovative recent studies have sought to address the problem of reverse causation by conducting
field experiments (de la Cuesta et al., 2015; Paler, 2013) and exploiting one-off exogenous shocks to oil
income (such as the 1973 oil price spike) (Liou & Musgrave, 2013). Alternative strategies for dealing with
omitted variable bias include the use of extreme bounds analysis (Gassebner, Lamla, & Vreeland., 2013),
synthetic controls (Liou & Musgrave, 2013), and, as discussed below, country fixed effects models.
37As mentioned in fn. 18, Tsui (2011) employed an instrumental variables approach to examine the
political resource curse at a similar time to Ramsay, using estimates of oil endowments as an instrument
for oil discoveries (the key determinant of oil wealth). For more recent applications of this approach, see
Cotet and Tsui (2013); Kennedy and Tiede (2013).
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Table 3. Ramsay 2011: Two-stage Least Squares: Polity IV Scores on Oil Income (Table 3)
World oil producers’ political freedom measure
Polity IV (1) Polity IV (2) Polity IV (3) Polity IV (4)
Replicated Imputed Replicated Imputed Replicated Imputed Replicated Imputed
Log Oil Income per
Capita -0.633*** -0.685** -0.356*** -0.276*** -0.356*** -0.278*** -0.357** -0.242***
(0.206) (0.290) (0.077) (0.049) (0.077) (0.049) (0.167) (0.083)
Log GDP per Capita 0.361*** 0.310*** 0.355*** 0.308*** 0.355** 0.263***
(0.056) (0.041) (0.053) (0.040) (0.155) (0.083)
GDP Growth -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.012** -0.008***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Polity at Entry -0.001 0.186
(0.371) (0.209)
Constant 2.803*** 3.272*** -1.031*** -0.799*** -0.961*** -0.737*** -0.962** -0.626***
(0.836) (1.238) (0.206) (0.148) (0.200) (0.142) (0.438) (0.219)
Log oil revenues per capita (first stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Out of Region
Disaster Estimates
0.178*** 0.154*** 0.245*** 0.296*** 0.244*** 0.297*** 0.117** 0.154***
(0.056) (0.050) (0.055) (0.044) (0.054) (0.044) (0.056) (0.048)
Log GDP per Capita 0.733*** 0.827*** 0.710*** 0.814*** 0.937*** 1.000***
(0.055) (0.046) (0.054) (0.046) (0.040) (0.033)
GDP Growth -0.040*** -0.042*** -0.027*** -0.032***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Polity at Entry -2.090*** -2.314***
(0.173) (0.162)
Constant 0.077 1.207 -7.127*** -7.992*** -6.888*** -7.742*** -5.051*** -5.330***
(1.245) (1.118) (1.417) (1.129) (1.406) (1.114) (1.353) (1.133)
N 1379 1680 1277 1,680 1267 1680 1267 1680
Dependent variable is level of democracy (measured using normalized Polity IV scores). Two-
stage least squares regressions with Newey-West heterosketastistic and autocorrelation-consistent
standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
rate of missingness, with more than 97 percent of cells observed (and 91 percent for the
instrument Log Out of Region Disaster Estimates). As a result, listwise deletion omits a
more modest 23 percent of eligible observations and 22 percent of observed values. This
ensures that differences in levels of democracy and oil income between included and
excluded observations (see the upper-right panels of Figures 1 and 2, respectively) are
less likely to seriously bias inferences produced by listwise deletion.
Ramsay’s findings, however, have not ended the debate due to doubts about the
validity of his instrument. As Haber and Menaldo (2011) point out in an influential
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study, global oil price shocks are usually met with offsetting increases in production by
major exporters, who have a policy of stabilizing prices. Thus, the instrument may be
picking up a “big producer” fixed effect (and thus be correlated with the error term).
To properly control for country-specific factors, Haber and Menaldo estimate an error
correction model with country fixed effects using new data on 163 countries from 1800
to 2006.38 The results do not support the political resource curse hypothesis: oil income
per capita and government reliance on resource revenues have a positive relationship
with changes in Polity IV scores (normalized to run from 0 to 100) (see Table 4).39
Haber and Menaldo’s analysis has been challenged by Andersen and Ross (2014),
who argue that it supports a conditional version of the political resource curse hy-
pothesis that posits a negative relationship between oil wealth and changes in levels
of democracy only after 1980. Indeed, when they add an interaction term between Total
Oil Income and a dummy for the post-1980 period to the core fixed effects models, its
coefficient is negative and significant (see Table 4).40 Andersen and Ross’s explanation
is that oil wealth only acquired antidemocratic properties following the widespread na-
tionalization of petroleum industries during the 1970s, which transferred oil rents from
international petroleum companies (most notably the so-called “Seven Sisters”) to gov-
ernments.41 This argument is consistent with the popular “rentier state” theory of the
political resource curse, according to which oil rents alleviate social pressures for democ-
ratization by enabling governments to reduce taxes and increase spending on patronage
(Beblawi & Luciani, 1987; Mahdavy, 1970; Ross, 2001).
38The model also includes time fixed effects, a lagged measure of Polity (for error correction), and a
number of control variables. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are used to account for spatial heterogeneity.
39This relationship is statistically significant in the case of oil income per capita. For a similar finding,
see Gurses (2009).
40Aslaksen (2010) also finds support for the resource curse hypothesis in the presence of country fixed
effects.
41The Seven Sisters were Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now BP), Gulf Oil, Mobil (now ExxonMobil)
Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil of California (now Chevron), Standard Oil of New Jersey (also now
ExxonMobil), and Texaco (now a subsidiary of Chevron).
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Table 4. Haber and Menaldo 2011: Error Correction Models; Andersen and Ross 2014: Replication of Haber-Menaldo ECM
(Table 2)
Model 1 (1) Andersen and Ross Model 2 (2) Andersen and Ross
Replicated Imputed Replicated Imputed Replicated Imputed Replicated Imputed
Polity in Levelst−1 -0.087*** -0.058*** -0.087*** -0.059*** -0.109*** -0.058*** -0.110*** -0.059***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.024) (0.005) (0.023) (0.005)
Total Oil Incomet−1 0.055*** -0.045 0.048** -0.024
(0.019) (0.033) (0.024) (0.031)
Total Oil Incomet−1 × Post-1980 -0.147*** -0.203***
(0.054) (0.062)
4 Total Oil Income -0.020 -0.063 -0.059** -0.103**
(0.021) (0.049) (0.027) (0.052)
4 Total Oil Income × Post-1980 -0.048 -0.047
(0.037) (0.065)
Log(per Capita Income)t−1 -0.279 0.212 -0.273 0.253* 0.845 0.122 0.324 0.095
(0.326) (0.138) (0.324) (0.137) (0.827) (0.177) (0.809) (0.177)
Civil Wart−1 0.065 -0.020 0.057 -0.030 1.435 -0.068 1.607 0.010
(0.458) (0.346) (0.458) (0.346) (1.330) (0.351) (1.331) (0.360)
Regional Democratic Diffusiont−1 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.012 0.032*** -0.002 0.029***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.023) (0.007) (0.024) (0.007)
Global Democratic diffusiont−1 0.058* -0.010 0.059** -0.005 -0.050 -0.011 -0.076* -0.000
(0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.039) (0.032) (0.042) (0.033)
4 Log(per Capita Income) 1.289 1.425 1.199 1.355 -3.698 1.071 -3.391 1.016
(1.772) (1.271) (1.774) (1.271) (3.771) (1.422) (3.800) (1.425)
4 Regional Democratic Diffusion 0.375*** 0.370*** 0.375*** 0.370*** 0.168* 0.371*** 0.167* 0.372***
(0.071) (0.056) (0.071) (0.056) (0.085) (0.055) (0.086) (0.055)
4 Global Democratic Diffusion -0.277** 0.015 -0.277** 0.016 0.113 0.012 0.120 0.021
(0.111) (0.116) (0.111) (0.116) (0.126) (0.115) (0.125) (0.115)
Fiscal Reliancet−1 0.023 0.005 0.047** 0.013
(0.018) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012)
Fiscal Reliancet−1 × Post-1980 -0.057*** -0.027**
(0.021) (0.011)
4 Fiscal Reliance 0.049** 0.036 0.042** 0.039
(0.022) (0.036) (0.020) (0.036)
4 Fiscal Reliance × Post-1980 0.004 -0.015
(0.026) (0.026)
Constant 6.989*** 1.025 6.959*** 0.790 2.443 1.623 6.986 1.835
(2.349) (2.004) (2.343) (1.998) (6.624) (2.209) (6.850) (2.205)
N 10195 17206 10195 17206 1132 17206 1132 17206
Dependent variable is change in democracy (measured by Polity IV scores normalized to run from 0 to 100). Country and time
fixed effects error-correction regressions with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (estimated with Newey-West adjustment with one
lag length) in parentheses. Separate country and year intercepts are not reported. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Haber and Menaldo’s dataset is highly incomplete, with 31 percent of cells missing
(and more than 50 percent for one-fifth of variables). Missing values for several variables
are filled in using linear interpolation, which produces biased standard errors (see fn.
9) as well as biased point estimates when — as is common in comparative politics —
variables change smoothly over time or exhibit sharp deviations from a trend (Honaker
& King, 2010). Listwise deletion is applied to the remaining variables, resulting in the
omission of 67 percent of eligible observations and the same proportion of observed data.
Interestingly, excluded observations have lower levels of democracy but higher levels of
resource income than included ones (see lower-left panels of Figures 1 and 2, respec-
tively).42 Specifically, data on 33 oil-producing autocracies are omitted, including every
major producer that has never democratized. This suggests that the analysis suffers
from the opposite selection problem to Ross’s: by excluding stable oil-rich autocracies,
it is biased against finding a negative relationship between oil wealth and democracy.
The combination of this selection problem, the high proportion of missing data, and
the use of two biased methods for handling such data ensures that multiple imputation
alters the results substantially. As shown in Table 4, in Haber and Menaldo’s original
analysis the positive coefficient on Total Oil Income loses significance and turns nega-
tive, while the coefficient on Fiscal Reliance, which was not significant in the first place,
shrinks to less than one-quarter of its original size.43 In Andersen and Ross’s modified
model, the coefficients on the interactions between these variables and the post-1980
dummy remain negative and significant, increasing by almost 50 percent in the case of
Total Oil Income. The coefficients on the two variables themselves, meanwhile, drop out
of significance, with that on Total Oil Income also turning negative. Interestingly, the
42Figure 4 plots the distribution of total fuel income per capita, which contains elements of both Total
Oil Income and Fiscal Reliance.
43I do not focus on Haber and Menaldo’s longitudinal graphical analysis (see pp. 5-11) because they
stress that it is merely suggestive, not providing the basis for causal inferences (since it does not control
for any potentially confounding factors).
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latter change might be seen as even more consistent with the logic of Andersen and
Ross’s conditional argument, since governments would presumably derive at least some
rents from oil wealth even before petroleum industries were nationalized (for instance,
through corporate taxes and royalties).44 Finally, it is important to note that the results
are also consistent with those of Ramsay’s analysis, even though the latter did not explic-
itly test a conditional version of the political resource curse hypothesis: since Ramsay’s
panel begins in 1968, almost every year covered by the analysis is either during or after
the wave of nationalizations.
Is Regime Type a Conditioning Factor?
The second issue with Ross’s analysis is that it fails to distinguish between two possi-
ble scenarios: (1) oil wealth reduces the likelihood that dictatorships become democra-
cies; and (2) oil wealth increases the likelihood that democracies become dictatorships
(Ulfelder, 2007). One of the most notable attempts to disentangle these possibilities has
been made by Morrison (2009), who argues that sources of nontax revenue such as oil
make both dictatorships and democracies more stable by enabling them to pursue fis-
cal policies that appease social groups who pose a threat to regime survival.45 In other
words, oil does not have antidemocratic properties per se, but only stabilizing properties.
Using a dataset on 184 countries in the period 1960-2002, Morrison tests this hypothe-
sis by logistically regressing a binary measure of regime change on nontax revenue per
capita and (separately) its three components, the largest of which is state-owned en-
terprise (SOE) revenue, the main form of oil rent for governments.46 The results bear
44Like Andersen and Ross, I place less weight on the Fiscal Reliance results because the data for this
variable only cover 18 countries (and are thus almost entirely imputed in the reanalysis).
45Specifically, they enable democracies to lower taxes on wealthy elites and dictatorships to increase
spending on poor citizens.
46The other two components are foreign aid and “other” nontax revenue, which mainly consists of
government borrowing. The models also include a number of control variables.
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out the hypothesis: as shown in Table A1 of the online appendix, the coefficients on all
measures of nontax revenue, including SOE revenue, are negative and significant.47
Morrison’s dataset is highly incomplete, with one-third of cells missing (and one-
third of variables possessing a missing-data rate of over 70 percent). Listwise deletion
discards 79 percent of eligible observations and 69 percent of observed data, resulting
in the complete exclusion of a remarkable 82 countries. Similarly to the previous case,
included observations have lower levels of democracy but higher levels of SOE revenue
than excluded ones (see lower-right panels of Figures 1 and 2, respectively). Unlike
before, however, the excluded data comprise a large number of oil-producing states that
underwent regime change away from democracy (and relatively few stable autocracies).
Indeed, shifts toward autocracy in a remarkable 60 oil producers — including nine of
the 20 largest today — are omitted from the analysis.48 The results are thus likely to
overestimate the stabilizing effects of oil rents and thus nontax revenues more broadly.49
Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, when the analysis is re-estimated with imputed data
the coefficients on both the overall measure of nontax revenue and its SOE revenue
component cease to be significant and fall to zero in the two core models (Models 1 and
2) (see Table A4).50
While these results signal the absence of a strong negative relationship between non-
tax revenue and regime instability, they do not distinguish between dictatorships and
democracies. In Table 5, therefore, I split the sample by regime type, focusing solely
on Nontax Revenue per Capita and SOE Revenue per Capita. Surprisingly, in the sample
47Similar findings about oil revenues (rather than nontax revenues more broadly) have been reported
by Dunning (2008); Smith (2004); Tsui (2011).
48These countries make up almost one-third of the excluded observations. Stable autocracies, by con-
trast, account for just eight percent (and oil-producing ones six percent).
49Figure A1 in the online appendix indicates that levels of nontax revenue are also higher in excluded
observations than included ones.
50The coefficients on the other two components of nontax revenue, whose values are also higher in
excluded observations than included ones, experience similar changes.
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Table 5. Morrison 2009: Table 3 with Split Samples
Democracies (Polity Score ≥ 7) Dictatorships (Polity Score ≤ 6)
(1) SOE Revenue (2) Nontax Revenue (3) Pre-1981 (4) SOE Revenue (5) Nontax Revenue (6) Pre-1981
LD MI LD MI MI LD MI LD MI LD MI
SOE Revenue per
Capitat−1
-0.001 0.000* 0.000 -0.001** -0.000*** -0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
GDP per Capita Growth -0.111* -0.017 -0.115** -0.012 -0.022 -0.059*** -0.011 -0.056*** -0.007 -0.131*** -0.019**
(0.058) (0.016) (0.058) (0.017) (0.024) (0.022) (0.007) (0.021) (0.007) (0.050) (0.008)
GDP per Capita (ln)t−1 -0.141 -0.357** -0.096 -0.297 -0.545*** 0.353** 0.282*** 0.172 0.228** 0.634 0.201*
(0.322) (0.172) (0.460) (0.202) (0.176) (0.155) (0.102) (0.131) (0.107) (0.399) (0.119)
4 % Population Urban 0.886* 0.442 0.994* 0.536 0.168 -0.003 -0.543** 0.072 -0.573** -1.214* -0.650**
(0.509) (0.398) (0.535) (0.375) (0.481) (0.294) (0.246) (0.286) (0.247) (0.682) (0.269)
Ethnolinguistic
Fractionalization 3.262** -0.695 3.346** -0.510 -0.887 -0.059 -0.231 -0.263 -0.209 1.252 0.267
(1.288) (0.797) (1.354) (0.816) (0.854) (0.576) (0.478) (0.562) (0.479) (1.187) (0.586)
Population Density (ln)t−1 0.209 -0.039 0.227 0.009 -0.132 -0.032 0.160* -0.069 0.166* -0.024 0.184**
(0.247) (0.156) (0.235) (0.147) (0.137) (0.100) (0.088) (0.096) (0.089) (0.238) (0.089)
Past Regime Instability -0.150 -1.224*** -0.146 -1.094*** -1.197*** 0.059 -0.375** 0.049 -0.377** 0.095 -1.029***
(0.161) (0.310) (0.169) (0.280) (0.389) (0.061) (0.156) (0.060) (0.157) (0.160) (0.234)
Regime Age -0.197 -0.063* -0.195 -0.067* -0.085** -0.376*** -0.070*** -0.372*** -0.072*** -0.487*** -0.086***
(0.210) (0.032) (0.213) (0.039) (0.043) (0.055) (0.015) (0.057) (0.015) (0.112) (0.019)
Spline (1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.000** 0.001*** 0.000** 0.002*** 0.000**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spline (2) 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000* 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Nontax Revenue per
Capitat−1
-0.001 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -4.063** 3.490** -4.479 2.550 5.174*** -2.925** -1.500* -1.492 -1.174 -4.367 -0.675
(1.828) (1.522) (2.868) (1.783) (1.542) (1.373) (0.869) (1.113) (0.935) (3.224) (0.997)
N 928 2314 922 2314 5238 907 5226 886 5226 301 2713
“LD” = listwise deletion; “MI” = multiple imputation. Dependent variable is regime instability (a dummy for whether a regime
changes in a given year). Logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Replicated results for
Model 3 are not provided because there are not enough observations in the original dataset to estimate the model. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
restricted to democracies (Models 1 and 2) the coefficients on both variables are non-
significant under listwise deletion. Under multiple imputation, the coefficient on SOE
Revenue per Capita becomes positive and significant, implying that oil undermines regime
stability in democracies. The coefficient on Nontax Revenue per Capita remains nonsignif-
icant and negative, however, suggesting that the other two components of the variable
do not destabilize democracies.51 As expected, in the sample restricted to dictatorships
(Models 4 and 5) the coefficients on the two variables are negative and significant under
listwise deletion. In line with earlier results, these estimates are robust to multiple impu-
tation (though the coefficients become slightly smaller). Critically, as shown in Models
3 and 6, the key findings are still subject to the earlier temporal condition: when the
sample is restricted to the pre-1981 period, the coefficient on SOE Revenue per Capita is
nonsignificant (with the same sign) in both democracies and dictatorships.52
To examine the robustness of these findings, I reanalyze the results of two even more
recent studies of the impact of oil wealth on regime stability that employ alternative
measures and data sources. The first is Ross’s (2012) important book “The Oil Curse,”
which separately analyzes regime change in dictatorships and democracies using a new
dataset covering 174 countries from 1960 to 2000. The results, displayed in Table 6, are
consistent with those reported above: oil income per capita has a negative and significant
effect on the probability of a dictatorship democratizing (Panel 1) and a positive and
significant effect on the probability of a democracy failing (Panel 2) — with the key
exception of the period 1960-79.53 These results are virtually unchanged by multiple
imputation, in large part due to the low level of missingness in the sample: only 8
51This difference is theoretically puzzling. One possible explanation is that it is easier to use oil and other
SOE revenues to pursue antidemocratic ends because — unlike foreign aid and government borrowing —
they are purely domestic and thus come with no international scrutiny or pressure.
52Model 3 only displays the results based on multiple imputation because there were not enough obser-
vations in the original dataset to estimate the model.
53I exclude Model 1 from the original tables, which only includes control variables.
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Table 6. Ross 2012: Transitions to Democracy, 1960-2006 (Table 3.7); Transitions to Authoritarian-
ism, 1960-2006 (Table 3.9)
(1) Dependent variable: Transition to democracy (dummy)
(2) (3) 1960-79 (4) 1980-2006 (5) (6)
Rep. Imp. Rep. Imp. Rep. Imp. Rep. Imp. Rep. Imp.
Income (log) 0.332* 0.158* 0.406 0.262 0.124 0.322 0.256 0.315 0.225 0.340*
(0.171) (0.084) (0.254) (0.389) (0.134) (0.197) (0.168) (0.194) (0.162) (0.202)
Regime Duration
(log) -0.046 -0.214** -0.122 0.151 -0.438*** -0.132 0.010 0.049 0.387* 0.506**
(0.181) (0.101) (0.303) (0.343) (0.141) (0.193) (0.181) (0.152) (0.229) (0.197)
Oil Income (log) -0.179** -0.126*** -0.078 0.074 -0.129** -0.202** -0.292*** -0.432*** -0.197** -0.372***
(0.079) (0.040) (0.114) (0.174) (0.059) (0.091) (0.092) (0.111) (0.090) (0.115)
Oil Income (log)
× Latin America 0.673*** 0.817*** 0.414*** 0.637***
(0.152) (0.179) (0.143) (0.188)
Prior Democracy 1.915*** 2.000***
(0.465) (0.526)
Economic
Growth
-0.054*** -0.064***
(0.017) (0.018)
Muslim
Population -0.720 -0.776
(0.551) (0.706)
N 3,507 4,239 1,297 1,715 2,210 2,524 3,507 4,239 3,422 4,239
(2) Dependent variable: Transition to authoritarianism (dummy)
(2) (3) Below $5,000 (4) Above $5,000 (5) 1960-79 (6) 1980-2006
Rep. Imp. Rep. Imp. Rep. Imp. Rep. Imp. Rep. Imp.
Regime Duration
(log) -0.342** -0.344** -0.240 -0.260 -0.892** -0.786 -0.417* -0.367 -0.280 -0.320
(0.169) (0.164) (0.164) (0.159) (0.452) (0.555) (0.242) (0.237) (0.209) (0.206)
Income (log) -0.717*** -0.704*** -0.580*** -0.568*** -2.480*** -1.835*** -0.689*** -0.693*** -0.960*** -0.948***
(0.144) (0.135) (0.177) (0.163) (0.651) (0.692) (0.172) (0.174) (0.218) (0.201)
Oil Income (log) 0.121** 0.123** 0.113* 0.123** 0.129 0.133 0.0949 0.098 0.242*** 0.252***
(0.0564) (0.056) (0.0630) (0.061) (0.174) (0.183) (0.117) (0.117) (0.0752) (0.077)
N 2,673 2,910 1,301 1,421 1,372 1,481 728 764 1,945 2,146
“Rep.” = Replicated; “Imp.” = Imputed. Explanatory variables are lagged one year (with the exception
of Prior Democracy). Panel 1 shows logistic regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. Five-
year period dummies not reported. Panel 2 shows rare-event logistic regressions with robust standard
errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
percent of data on Oil Income are missing, while the remaining variables in the analysis
have an average missing-data rate of 11 percent. As a result, listwise deletion omits only
13 percent of eligible observations and 5 percent of observed values.54
Ross’s explanation for these results is that oil wealth stabilizes incumbents rather than
54I do not compare levels of democracy and oil income in included and excluded observations because
the sample is restricted to either dictatorships or democracies.
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regimes, which in the case of democracies involves giving them sufficient resources to
dismantle institutional constraints by “buying off” citizens with lower taxes and in-
creased public spending (Ross, 2012, pp. 75-77).55 An interesting implication of this
argument is that poor democracies will be more prone to failure because their institu-
tions tend to be weaker and their citizens easier to buy off. Indeed, as shown in Panel
1 of Table 6, the coefficient on Oil Income ceases to be significant when the sample is
restricted to countries with a GDP per capita above $5,000 (Model 3), but remains sig-
nificant — albeit only at the 10 percent level — when restricted to countries below this
threshold (Model 4). As before, these results are robust to multiple imputation, with the
coefficient in the latter model becoming significant at the five percent level. Hence, the
antidemocratic effects of oil appear to be contingent upon income as well as time period.
The second study is Wright, Frantz, and Geddes’s (2015) analysis of the effects of oil
wealth on autocratic regime survival. Wright, Frantz, and Geddes seek to distinguish
between two mechanisms by which oil wealth could enhance the stability of dictator-
ships: (1) lowering the chances of democratization (as indicated by the above results);
and (2) reducing the risk of transition to subsequent dictatorship. They employ an inno-
vative empirical strategy that also enables them to separate the between-country effects
of oil wealth (i.e., the effects of cross-national variation in average levels of oil wealth)
from the within-country effects (i.e., the effects of over-time changes in oil wealth in a
single country) by conditioning the marginal effects of covariates on country means for
explanatory variables.56 They apply this strategy to a sample of 280 autocratic regimes in
55Similarly, a number of subnational studies have found that oil windfalls have pro-incumbent effects
(Gervasoni, 2010; Goldberg, Wibbels, & Mvukiyehe, 2008; Mahdavi, 2015).
56Most previous research solely examines between-country effects. A notable exception is Haber and
Menaldo’s study, which examines within-country effects in both dictatorships and democracies, though
only in a subsidiary analysis whose results are reported in an online appendix. Wright, Frantz, and
Geddes argue that Haber and Menaldo’s choice of statistical model results in the exclusion of a large
number of stable autocracies from the analysis and thus produces downward-biased estimates (a very
similar selection problem to the one highlighted earlier).
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140 nations from 1945 to 2010, using Haber and Menaldo’s data on oil income per capita.
The results, displayed in Table 7, indicate that oil income has a negative impact on the
overall likelihood of autocratic regime failure (captured by the coefficient on Oilt−1),
but only negative between-country effects (Oili) on the likelihood of democratization and
within-country effects (Oildev) on the likelihood of autocratic transition.57
Wright, Frantz, and Geddes’s dataset contains a moderate proportion of missing val-
ues: seven percent of cells are missing, with analysis variables possessing an average
missing-data rate of 11 percent. Since almost 20 percent on values on the three de-
pendent variables are missing, however, listwise deletion discards 25 percent of eligible
observations and 20 percent of observed data, causing 32 countries to be entirely omitted
from the analysis.58 When the results are re-estimated using multiple imputation, oil in-
come continues to have a negative impact on the overall probability of autocratic regime
failure, consistent with the reanalyzed results of the previous two studies. Interestingly,
however, the within-country effects of oil income become negative and significant in the
case of democratic transitions and remain so in the case of autocratic transitions. The
between-country effects, meanwhile, become slightly weaker in the former but consid-
erably stronger in the latter, only just exceeding the 10 percent significance threshold
in both cases.59 Hence, there is fairly strong evidence that oil income has negative
within-country and between-country effects on the likelihood of both democratization
and autocratic transition. Once again, however, this finding only holds for the post-1980
period: when the sample is restricted to the years 1945-80, the coefficients on Oili and
Oildev cease to be significant (or close to the 10 percent threshold) in every model.
57I omit Models 2, 3, and 5 from the original table, which are restricted to autocracies that experi-
ence regime change (for the purpose of examining how excluding stable autocracies — like Haber and
Menaldo’s within-country analysis — affects the results).
58As with Ross (2012), I do not compare levels of democracy and oil income between included and
excluded observations because the sample is restricted to dictatorships.
59The average p-value of the coefficients on Oili is 0.13 in the case of democratic transitions (Panel B)
and 0.16 in the case of autocratic transitions (Panel C)).
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Table 7. Wright, Frantz, and Geddes 2015: Oil Income and Autocratic Regime Survival (Table 1)
(1) Full (4) Full (6) Full
All Years Pre-1981 All Years Pre-1981 All Years Pre-1981
LD MI LD MI LD MI LD MI LD MI LD MI
(A) All regime failures
Oilt−1 -0.121***-0.117*-0.076 -0.080
(0.038) (0.063) (0.050)(0.064)
Oili -0.111***-0.115 -0.057 -0.078 -0.071** -0.103 0.002 -0.062
(0.040) (0.072) (0.049) (0.066)(0.035) (0.074) (0.049) (0.068)
Oildev -0.166 -0.131**-0.204 -0.085 -0.290** -0.154**-0.307** -0.086
(0.127) (0.065) (0.143) (0.111)(0.135) (0.068) (0.156) (0.111)
Y¯i 14.901***5.574***13.859***3.524**
(1.369) (1.692) (1.352) (1.500)
N 4,138 5,675 2,167 2,848 4,138 5,675 2,167 2,848 4,138 5,675 2,167 2,848
(B) Democratic transitions
Oilt−1 -0.153***-0.121*-0.171 -0.086
-0.054 (0.067) (0.106)(0.071)
Oili -0.224***-0.125 -0.215**-0.089 -0.169*** -0.110 -0.061 -0.070
-0.07 (0.077) (0.108) (0.074)(0.064) (0.078) (0.100) (0.075)
Oildev 0.107 -0.105* 0.158 -0.044 -0.038 -0.123* -0.026 -0.049
-0.155 (0.063) (0.293) (0.116)(0.186) (0.066) (0.293) (0.116)
Y¯i 24.107***6.206** 23.035***3.816*
(3.552) (2.516) (3.933) (2.145)
N 4,138 5,675 2,167 2,848 4,138 5,675 2,167 2,848 4,138 5,675 2,167 2,848
(C) Autocratic transitions
Oilt−1 -0.055 -0.110*-0.043 -0.074
(0.054) (0.066) (0.067)(0.066)
Oili -0.014 -0.106 0.001 -0.070 -0.023 -0.107 -0.006 -0.071
(0.054) (0.075) (0.068) (0.069)(0.049) (0.076) (0.066) (0.070)
Oildev -0.280** -0.136**-0.305**-0.090 -0.347** -0.141**-0.355** -0.086
(0.141) (0.063) (0.144) (0.108)(0.145) (0.063) (0.155) (0.108)
Y¯i 19.877***4.226* 19.285***3.328
(2.708) (2.429) (2.777) -2.245
N 4,138 5,675 2,167 2,848 4,138 5,675 2,167 2,848 4,138 5,675 2,167 2,848
“LD” = listwise deletion; “MI” = multiple imputation. Dependent variable is the likelihood of regime
failure in Panel A, transition to democracy in Panel B, and transition to autocracy in Panel C. Logistic
regressions with standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Time dependence polynomials,
calendar time polynomials, and control variables (GDP per Capita, Civil War, Neighbor Democracy)
included in all models but not reported. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
In sum, multiple imputation does not support the claim that oil wealth enhances
regime stability in democracies as well as dictatorships. Nor does it support studies that
have found no relationship between oil wealth and democratic stability (Al-Ubaydli,
2012; Caselli & Tesei, forthcoming; Ulfelder, 2007; Wiens, Poast, & Clark, 2014). Rather,
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it suggests that oil wealth has antidemocratic effects, reducing the likelihood of regime
change in dictatorships — both within and across countries – and increasing it in democ-
racies. However, consistent with the findings of the previous subsection, such effects
only occur in the post-1980 period (and may also be restricted to poor democracies).
Conclusion
Given the methodological sophistication of the ongoing debate over the political resource
curse, it is puzzling that scholars have paid such little attention to the basic statistical
issue of how to deal with missing data. This article has highlighted the methodological
problems associated with the most common strategy for analyzing missing values in
the political resource curse literature — listwise deletion — and shown that addressing
these problems through the use of multiple imputation causes the results of a number of
notable recent studies to converge on a key common finding: a political resource curse
does exist, but only since the wave of petroleum industry nationalizations in the 1970s,
which provided governments with greater access to the rents from oil production. This
striking finding suggests that much of the disagreement over the political resource curse
has been caused by a neglect of missing-data issues.
The finding is significant from a theoretical perspective, strengthening claims by Ross,
Andersen, and others (e.g., Boschini, Pettersson, & Roine, 2012; Luong & Weinthal, 2010;
Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005) that the capacity of states to capture oil rents — a capac-
ity that has varied considerably over time — is a critical determinant of whether oil
wealth adversely affects democracy. Such arguments, in turn, contribute to an important
broader research agenda that seeks to better understand the scope conditions of the po-
litical resource curse (for an overview, see Ross, 2015). This line of research has mostly
focused on the conditioning effects of a state’s initial regime type, which, as shown in
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the third section, are substantially weaker than commonly believed. Developing inte-
grated theories of the political resource curse that can reconcile and illuminate different
findings regarding scope conditions — such as Ross’s recent (2012) theory of incumbent
empowerment (see third section) — is an essential task for future research.
The results of the reexamination also have important implications for methodological
practices in the political resource curse literature. Beyond the obvious implication that
statistical analyses of this issue should adopt a more sophisticated approach to handling
incomplete data, they suggest that scholars should generally be more explicit about how
many missing values their datasets contain, how they deal with such values, and what
consequences this choice may have for the validity of their inferences. The present situ-
ation is somewhat perverse: the studies that are least likely to provide such information
are those using missing-data methods that require the most justification. The statisti-
cal and substantive importance of the changes brought about by multiple imputation
suggests that the gains from adopting such practices could be substantial.
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